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I. INTRODUCTION
Francisco Alvarez1, an immigrant worker originally from Ecua-
dor, has won three separate judgments against three different em-
ployers for claims of unpaid wages.2 However, Francisco has not
received any of the money his employers owe him, wages he earned
while working on different construction sites around New York
City. Francisco is a member of the Latino/a immigrant rights or-
ganization Make the Road New York (“MRNY”) in New York City
and Long Island.3 Working with the organization’s legal team, he
filed claims of unpaid wages with the New York State Department
of Labor (“NY DOL”) on three separate occasions. Each time, after
waiting roughly nine to twelve months while the NY DOL investi-
gated his claims, he received judgments in his favor. By the time he
received the news, his employers had already hidden their assets4
1 All names in this piece have been changed to protect the identity of the
subjects.
2 Case file, on file with Make the Road New York. Contact author for details.
3 Make the Road New York has community centers in Brooklyn, Queens, Staten
Island, and Long Island. Its 11,000 members “work together in active member-led
committees around issues of critical importance to low-income, immigrant workers
and their families, such as wage theft.” Deborah Axt, Amy Carroll, & Andrew Fried-
man, Advocacy Story: The Campaign to Pass the New York Wage Theft Act, 45 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 154, 154 (2011) [hereinafter Advocacy Story]; see also MAKE THE ROAD NEW
YORK, www.maketheroadny.org/whoweare_aboutourcommunity.php (last visited Nov.
19, 2012).
4 Interview with Elizabeth Wagoner, former Staff Attorney, Make the Road New
York, in N.Y.C. (Aug. 3, 2011). Notes on file with the author.
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and claimed they could not afford to pay the judgments.
Fellow MRNY member Maria, an immigrant worker from Mex-
ico, had better luck, but still had to wait months before receiving
her pay.5 While working at a lamp factory in Manhattan, she
worked over seventy hours a week without being paid overtime for
more than a year. Maria received almost $10,000 in unpaid over-
time, with the assistance of the MRNY legal team.
Maria and Francisco are but two examples of wage theft in
New York City. According to estimates, nearly one billion dollars
are stolen annually from low-wage workers in New York City alone.6
MRNY’s fourteen years of organizing and advocating with workers
around similar stories of wage theft7 inspired the organization’s
members, community organizers, and attorneys to tackle the prob-
lem head on. They decided to draft legislation to change New York
State’s existing labor law and gain more protections for immigrant
workers.8
This paper will examine this widespread problem of wage theft
in New York City, especially amongst low-wage workers. The paper
will focus on the Wage Theft Prevention Act (“WTPA”), legislation
that increases workers’ protections under the New York Labor
Law.9 Part I will discuss what is commonly known as wage theft and
common employment and labor law violations. This section will
also discuss current data on the breadth of workplace violations in
low-wage industries in New York City, and discuss who is most af-
fected by wage theft. Part II will discuss current legal remedies
available to victims of wage theft, under federal and New York law.
This section will also analyze key provisions of the 2010 law passed
in New York State to combat wage theft, the WTPA, and how the
new law differs from former New York State Labor Laws and fed-
eral remedies. Part IV addresses objections to the WTPA. Part V
discusses the need for both the NY DOL and workers’ rights groups
to conduct education and outreach in order to effectively imple-
ment the new law. Wage theft is a serious problem affecting our
5 Sam Dolnick, Workers’ Safeguards Strengthened by N.Y. Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/nyregion/14wage.html?emc=eta1
(quoting Maria saying that the new wage theft law in New York State “is very great
because this [wage theft] won’t happen to someone else”).
6 See Annette Bernhardt, Diana Polson, & James DeFilippis, WORKING WITHOUT
LAWS: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 44
(2010), http://nelp.3cdn.net/990687e422dcf919d3_h6m6bf6ki.pdf [hereinafter
WORKING WITHOUT LAWS].
7 Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 1.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 113–25.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 10–55, for a discussion of wage theft.
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communities, and the WTPA will be an effective tool for combating
wage theft and protecting workers’ rights.
II. WAGE THEFT: A PERVASIVE PROBLEM IN NEW YORK
A. Wage Theft and Low-Wage Industries
Wage theft is a widespread problem that affects many workers
from different backgrounds and in different industries. Wage and
hour violations10 are especially common in low-wage industries.11
The term “wage theft” refers to various violations of federal, state,
and local wage and hour or labor laws, including nonpayment of
wages due for work completed, including overtime.12 It occurs
“when an employer violates the law and deprives a worker of legally
mandated wages” governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) and state labor laws.13 In addition, wage theft refers to
the following scenarios:  employers fail to give workers a final
paycheck after leaving a job, workers receive less than the hourly
minimum wage or less pay than promised, workers work off the
clock without pay, have tips stolen or illegal deductions from
paychecks, and workers are misclassified as independent contrac-
tors by their employers (in order to avoid coverage under federal
and state labor laws).14
A sample of workers from low-wage industries in three major
U.S. cities found that “over a quarter of low-wage workers receive
less than the minimum wage rate required by law: 60% of those are
underpaid by more than $1.00 an hour.”15 Organizations and re-
searchers have various definitions of what constitutes a low-wage
industry. The primary data utilized in this paper, from a 2008 study
conducted by researchers at the National Employment Law Project
10 The term wage and hour laws can refer to “any law that covers claims for unpaid
minimum, overtime and promised wages, as well as rest breaks, meal periods, child
labor, etc.” See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 10 (Jan. 2011), http://www.
nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf?nocdn=1 [hereinafter
WINNING WAGE JUSTICE].
11 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6.
12 KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE
NOT GETTING PAID – AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 7 (2008).
13 Id.
14 INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE, http://www.iwj.org/issues/wage-theft (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012); see also WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 6.
15 ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS
OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 21 (2009), available at http://
www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1.
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(“NELP”),16 defines “low-wage industries” as industries in which
the average hourly wage for front-line workers (workers other than
management) was less than 85% of New York City’s average wage.17
The “85% threshold” is a measure commonly used to identify low-
wage industries.18 Other scholars have defined low-wage jobs as
those in which a full-time, year-round worker earns less than the
poverty threshold for a family of four (two adults and two chil-
dren).19 NELP used 2000 Census data to create a list of industries
in New York City in which median wages fell below 85% of the
city’s average hourly wage.20 Examples of low-wage industries in-
clude restaurant work, poultry processing, janitorial services, gar-
ment manufacturing, agricultural jobs, domestic homecare
workers, and retail.21 Studies show the low-wage workforce is major-
ity female22 and foreign-born undocumented women workers are
most likely to experience workplace violations.23
New job growth since the recent “Great Recession” has been
16 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 12–13.
17 Id. at 54.
18 Id.
19 HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL, UNDERSTANDING LOW-WAGE WORK IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2007), available at http://inclusionist.org/files/lowwagework.pdf (defining
low-wage work with wage-based definitions, as opposed to approaches that describe
low-wage workers as those whose annual earnings are below a certain threshold and
describing two alternative ways of calculating what is a low-wage job, the basic-income
approach and the social-inclusion approach).
20 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 54.
21 See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, HOLDING THE WAGE FLOOR: ENFORCEMENT OF LA-
BOR STANDARDS FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 6–7 (Oct. 2006), available at http://nelp.
3cdn.net/95b39fc0a12a8d8a34_iwm6bhbv2.pdf. The 2006 policy update lists re-
sources and statistics on wage and hour violations in many low-wage sectors, barriers
to enforcing wage and hour laws, and recommendations for improvement, naming
examples of successful legislative and organizing campaigns. Statistics of violations in
low-wage industries include: nearly 80% of workers in the agriculture industry are
underpaid, in 2000 the U.S. Department of Labor (“U.S.DOL”) has found that 100%
of poultry processing plants were in violation of wage and hour laws, in 2005 a study
found that the majority of employers in the New York City restaurant business “were
not in compliance with overtime and minimum wage laws,” in 2001, “about half of the
garment-manufacturing businesses in New York City were in violation of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act,” in 2000, “the U.S.DOL found that 60% of nursing homes rou-
tinely violated overtime, minimum wage, and/or child labor laws,” 26% of domestic
homecare workers earn below the poverty line, and 67% of workers do not receive
overtime payment.
22 Marlene Kim, Women Paid Low Wages: Who They Are and Where They Work,
MONTHLY LABOR REV., Sept. 2000 at 26, available at www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/09/
art3full.pdf.
23 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS, IMMIGRATION STATUS, AND
GENDER: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 UNREGULATED WORK SURVEY (Aug.
2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/Fact_Sheet_Workplace
_Violations_Immigration_Gender.pdf?nocdn=1.
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primarily concentrated in low-wage industries. These industries
have accounted for 49% of recent job growth in the private sector
between January 2010 and January 2011.24 U.S. Bureau of Labor
statistics also show an increase in the number of low-wage workers
in New York State: in 2009 there were 192,000 low-wage workers in
the state, compared to 95,000 in 2005.25 This suggests that many
workers’ current job prospects are in low-wage industries. Thus,
combating wage theft amongst low-wage industries is increasingly
important.
Wage theft, while causing individual workers to suffer eco-
nomic losses, also impacts the economy as a whole and unfairly
disadvantages employers who comply with the law. The effects of
wage theft on individual workers and their families can be devastat-
ing, as minimum-wage workers bring home more than half (54%)
of their family’s weekly earnings.26 Low-wage workers who are vic-
tims of wage theft still have to pay rent, feed themselves and their
family, and pay for childcare or education costs.27 Additionally,
workers who suffer wage theft therefore have less money to save for
future expenses.28 Researchers “estimate that [New York City]
workers lose an average of $3,016 annually” because of wage and
hour violations, “out of total annual earnings of $20,644.”29 Subse-
quently, workers had approximately 15% of their earnings lost due
to wage theft.30 Researchers also estimate that approximately
317,263 workers in New York City suffer at least one pay-based la-
bor law violation per week, meaning that low-wage workers lose
24 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, A YEAR OF UNBALANCED GROWTH: INDUSTRIES, WAGES,
AND THE FIRST 12 MONTHS OF JOB GROWTH AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 4 (Feb. 2011),
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/UnbalancedGrowthFeb2011.
pdf?nocdn=1 (analyzing eighty-two detailed industries and creating three groups
based on their median wages: lower-wage, mid-wage, and higher-wage industries, and
tracking the job losses and job growth of each group).
25 JACOB MEYER & ROBERT GREENLEAF, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL NAT’L STATE ATTOR-
NEYS GEN. PROGRAM, ENFORCEMENT OF STATE WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A SURVEY OF
STATE REGULATORS 55 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null
?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=551819&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3D
Wage%20and%20Hour%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (citing U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BU-
REAU OF LABOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/earnings.htm#minwage (workers at or below minimum
wage).
26 See KAI FILION, ECON. POLICY INST., MINIMUM WAGE ISSUE GUIDE 2–3 (Jul. 21,
2009).
27 See BOBO, supra note 12, at 22.
28 Id.
29 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 6.
30 Id.
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more than $18.4 million per week combined,31 money that is not
able to be reinvested in the community. Using these figures, wage
theft can be said to account for nearly $1 billion annually in stolen
wages for low-wage workers in New York City.32 Less disposable in-
come translates into less money spent at local businesses.33 In addi-
tion, ethical employers who abide by federal and state wage and
hour laws are at a competitive disadvantage, as they have higher
labor costs than their dishonest competitors who are increasing
profits by violating the law.34 Furthermore, dishonest employers
steal from taxpayers when they do not pay their fair share of pay-
roll taxes.35
B. Illustrating the Problem: Wage Theft Statistics in New York City
1. Minimum Wage Violations
Statistics show that in New York City alone, many workers re-
ceive far less than the minimum wage mandated by law. Twenty-
one percent of the workers surveyed (male and female) were paid
less than the minimum wage in their previous workweek, and more
than 50% were underpaid by more than $1 an hour.36 At least one-
third of the workers in laundry and dry-cleaning businesses, in pri-
vate households, in beauty salons, nail salons, barbershops, and
grocery stores were paid less than the minimum wage.37 Immigrant
women suffered especially high rates of minimum wage violations.
Forty percent of unauthorized immigrant women in the study suf-
fered violations in the week prior to the study, compared to 13% of
U.S.-born women and 24% of foreign-born authorized immigrant
women (and 10% for U.S.-born men).38 Latino/a workers suffered
higher rates of minimum wage violations than Asian, black, or
white workers (U.S.-born white workers in the sample did not re-
port minimum wage violations).39 Also, there was little variation of
minimum wage violation rates between immigrant workers (male
and female) who had recently settled in the U.S. and those who
had been here for more than six years, as well as little difference in
violation rates amongst immigrants (male and female) who spoke
31 Id.
32 Id. at 44.
33 WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 6.
34 See BOBO, supra note 12, at 22.
35 Id.; see also WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 6–7.
36 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 18.
37 Id. at 26.
38 Id. at 38, 40.
39 Id. at 38.
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English well and those who spoke little English.40
2. Overtime Violations
Lack of overtime pay41 is a serious wage and hour violation
that affects countless workers in New York City alone. Regarding
overtime violations, 36% of male and female workers surveyed
worked more than forty hours during the previous workweek and
are therefore eligible to receive overtime pay. Amongst these work-
ers, a shocking 77% were not paid the legally required overtime
pay (the average worker had worked over thirteen hours extra,
without proper compensation).42 Overtime violation rates were
very high amongst all industries included in the survey; these viola-
tions were highest among hairdressers, cosmetologists, and laundry
and dry-cleaning workers.43 Ninety-eight percent of workers in
these occupations who worked more than forty hours a week in the
previous workweek suffered overtime violations.44 The personal
and repair services, social services, child day care centers, and
schools combined had a 97% rate of overtime violations45 Eighty-
five percent of workers in private households also reported that
they did not receive payment due for overtime.46 As one workers’
rights advocate put it, it can seem like “nobody pays overtime.”47
Immigrant workers disproportionately suffered from overtime
violations, and undocumented immigrant female workers reported
higher rates of overtime violations than documented immigrant fe-
40 Id. at 38, 39.
41 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2011) (after forty hours of work for the same employer
in one workweek, employees are due payment at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the employee’s regular rate of pay); 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2011) (under FLSA, cer-
tain positions are exempt from overtime coverage); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, E-LAWS-FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT ADVISOR: EXEMPTIONS, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/
screen75.asp (listing positions exempt from overtime coverage); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.2 (2011) (overtime is calculated the same under New York
State Labor Law as under FLSA); Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LA-
BOR, WAGES AND HOURS, http://www.labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/
faq.shtm#5 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (where an employee is subject to both the state
and federal overtime laws, the employee is entitled to overtime according to the law
that would provide the higher rate of pay); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, E-LAWS-FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT ADVISOR: WHEN IS OVERTIME PAY DUE?, available at http://www.
dol.gov/elaws/faq/esa/flsa/011.htm2.
42 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 18, 20.
43 Id. at 29–30.
44 Id. at 29.
45 Id. at 29–30.
46 Id.
47 Conversation between the author and immigrant workers’ rights advocate.
Summer 2010.
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male workers. Eighty-three percent of immigrant workers reported
overtime violations, compared with 63% for U.S.-born survey par-
ticipants (with foreign-born men suffering slightly more than for-
eign-born women).48 Amongst immigrant workers, unauthorized
foreign-born women workers had a 90% overtime violation rate,
compared to 75.5% for authorized women immigrant workers.49
U.S.-born women workers reported a 74% rate of overtime viola-
tions, compared to 51% for U.S.-born males.50 In contrast to mini-
mum wage violations, English-speaking ability did make a
difference for overtime violation rates: immigrant workers who re-
ported that they did not speak English well or at all reported a
violation rate of 89%, compared with a 68% violation rate amongst
workers who reported speaking English well or very well.51
3. Illegal Retaliation Against Workers
Many workers are afraid to speak up about unsafe working
conditions or unpaid wages because of a well-founded fear of retali-
ation.52 Twenty-three percent of respondents made a complaint
about unsafe working conditions or unpaid wages.53 Forty-two per-
cent of these respondents reported that their employers had taken
negative actions after they spoke out: 74% had their hours cut or
received less desirable assignments, 32% were fired or suspended,
32% were threatened with firing or deportation, and 31% were
harassed or had an increase in work load.54 Twenty-three percent
of the total workers surveyed reported that even though they ex-
perienced serious problems at work in the last year, such as on-the-
job safety issues, wage theft, or discrimination, they did not make a
complaint, for fear of retaliation.55




52 See Mitchell v. Robert de Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (workers
fear retaliation by their employers that may cause employees to accept substandard
conditions); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1058–59 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Aguilar v. Baine Services Sys., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 581, 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (employees not only stand to lose their jobs if they speak up, but their
dignity and ability to provide for their families).
53 WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 22.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 22–23.
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III. FEDERAL AND NEW YORK STATE LAWS GOVERNING
WAGE THEFT
A. Federal Law: The Fair Labor Standards Act
The federal law governing wage theft is the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (“FLSA”).56 Enacted in 1938,57 it provides for a federal
minimum hourly wage,58 in addition to other provisions that pro-
tect workers’ rights. For example, FLSA mandates that employers
must pay overtime at a rate of time and a half of the employee’s
regular rate of pay if employees work over forty hours a week.59 In
addition, FLSA bans employers from retaliating against an em-
ployee for asserting his or her rights guaranteed by FLSA.60 FLSA
defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”61
An “employer” is broadly defined as “any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an em-
ployee,”62 and defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work.”63
FLSA coverage is thought of in two ways: individual and enter-
prise.64  Individual FLSA coverage extends to workers who are di-
rectly engaged in interstate commerce or in production of goods
for interstate commerce.65 Enterprise coverage extends to employ-
ees who are employed by a business that is engaged in interstate
commerce or in the production of goods for interstate com-
merce.66 Businesses with annual gross value of sales of over
$500,000 a year are by definition engaged in interstate commerce,
and all of its employees are covered under FLSA.67 Not all workers
are covered under FLSA; if a worker’s employer is not involved in a
business that is deemed to be involved in interstate commerce, or if
the business’s annual sales are less than $500,000 (as is the case
with many small restaurants and shops), then a worker’s only rem-
56 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2011).
57 Id.
58 Id. § 206(a)(1) (current federal minimum wage is $7.25 an hour).
59 Id. § 207(a)(1)-(2) (creating the eight-hour work day).
60 Id. § 215(a)(3).
61 Id. § 203(e)(1).
62 Id. § 203(d).
63 Id. § 203(g).
64 See WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14: COVERAGE
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (July 2009), available at http://www.
dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs14.pdf.; see also id. §§ 203(a), (r)(1).
65 WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14: COVERAGE UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (July 2009), available at www.dol.gov/whd/regs/com
pliance/whdfs14.pdf.
66 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A) (2011). The FLSA contains a lengthy list of employ-
ees who are exempt from some of its provisions. Id. § 213.
67 Id. § 203(s)(1)(A).
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edy is governed by state labor laws. Undocumented immigrant
workers are eligible to seek redress under FLSA.68
Workers covered under FLSA may bring administrative ac-
tions69 and also have a private right of action70  (for violations of
unpaid wages, overtime, or retaliation, for example). Administra-
tive complaints may be filed with the U.S. Department of Labor
(“U.S. DOL”).71 The U.S. DOL will investigate the claim and has
the right to file an action against the employer.72 Advocates have
critiqued the U.S. DOL for a shortage of staffing, resulting in long
wait times for workers’ claims to be resolved.73 Advocates also claim
that the U.S. DOL does not administer strict penalties to employers
who violate the law.74 The Brennan Center for Justice analyzed
data relating to the U.S. DOL’s Wage and Hour Division enforce-
ment activities during the years 1975–2004.75 The organization
found that the Department’s resources and activities to enforce
wage and hour laws had declined while the number of workers and
workplaces in the U.S. had increased.76 A March 2009 report by the
Government Accountability Office determined that the U.S. DOL’s
Wage and Hour Division only successfully investigated one out of
ten cases brought to the Department by undercover agents.77 Ac-
cording to the U.S. DOL, in 2010 the number of Wage and Hour
68 See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT & NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., IMMIGRATION AND
LABOR ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: THE REVISED DOL-DHS MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/Im
migrationLaborEnforcementWorkplace.pdf?nocdn=1 (indicating that the Depart-
ment of Labor and Department of Homeland Security reiterate that immigration en-
forcement will not interfere with employment and labor rights enforcement in the
workplace).
69 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2011).
70 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., BRIDGE TO JUSTICE: WAGE
AND HOUR CONNECTS WORKERS TO NEW ABA-APPROVED ATTORNEY REFERRAL SYSTEM,
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/ABAReferralPolicy.htm (last visited
Dec. 3, 2012).
71 See How to File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, www.dol.gov/wecanhelp/
howtofilecomplaint.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
72 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2011).
73 See generally Todd A. Palo, Minimum Wage, Justifiably Unenforced?, 35 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J 36, 44 (2010).
74 Id. at 48.
75 Annette Bernhardt & Siobhán McGrath, U.S. Trends in Wage and Hour Enforce-
ment by the U.S. Department of Labor: 1975-2004, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 2005),
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/EJP/TrendsInEnforcement2005.pdf.
76 See id.
77 GREGORY D. KUTZ & JONATHAN T. MEYER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE
LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 4 (Mar. 2009), available at http://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-458T.
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Division investigators increased, allowing the agency to reduce the
backlog of complaints and conduct more targeted investigations of
industries at high-risk of wage and hour law violations.78
A worker covered by FLSA may also choose to exercise a pri-
vate (civil) right of action against the employer, for violations of
minimum wage, overtime, and anti-retaliation provisions.79 The
statute of limitations is two years; three years if the employer’s vio-
lation is found to be willful.80 Under a FLSA civil claim, a court may
award damages in the amount of unpaid minimum wages and over-
time due, plus liquidated damages in the amount equal to the un-
paid wages.81 Workers may receive reasonable attorney’s fees in
FLSA private civil suits.82
Many low-wage workers are exempt from coverage. Multiple
low wage industries are exempt from FLSA’s minimum and maxi-
mum hours requirements83 and certain child labor provisions.84
Examples include seasonal amusement park workers,85 camp work-
ers,86 employees in the catching, farming, and processing of sea-
food,87 some agricultural workers,88 babysitters,89 and domestic
caretakers of the elderly.90 Employees employed by businesses that
report less than $500,000 annual gross revenue do not have to
comply with FLSA.91 Finally, “independent contractors” are not
covered under FLSA.92 By having employees fill out IRS form 1099s
(the form used by independent contractors) instead of W-2 forms,
employers avoid FLSA minimum wage requirements.93 Therefore,
access to state law remedies and state enforcement agencies is key
78 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010 15 (2011),
available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/annual2010/2010annualreport.
pdf.
79 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2011).
80 Id. § 255(a).
81 Id. § 216(b).
82 Id.
83 Id. § 213.
84 Id. § 213(c).
85 29 U.S.C. § 213(a3) (2011).
86 Id.
87 Id. § 213(a5).
88 Id. § 213(a6).
89 Id. §213(a15).
90 Id.
91 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (2011).
92 Id § 203(r)(1) (2011).
93 See Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373,
378–79 (2008); see also NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 1099’D: MISCLASSIFICATION OF EM-
PLOYEES AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (2005), available at http://www.nelp.org/
page/-/Justice/1099edFactSheet2010.pdf?nocdn=1.
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to addressing wage theft, because not all workers are covered by
federal law.
B. New York State Labor Law
1. General Provisions
As in other states, New York State has its own law governing
wage and hour violations, the New York State Labor Law (“NYS
LL”).94 Similar to federal law, workers may file an administrative
complaint with the New York State Department of Labor (“NY
DOL”),95 or file a private civil suit in state court. The statute of
limitations is six years.96 According to NYS LL, the state minimum
wage must equal or exceed the federal minimum wage.97 The law
regarding overtime requirements is similar to FLSA,98 as employers
are required to pay workers who work over forty hours a week the
overtime pay rate of one-and-a-half times their regular rate of
pay.99 However, NYS LL provides for an additional extra hour of
minimum wage pay owed to the employee if he or she works more
than ten hours in a single day.100 New York’s definitions of em-
ployee and employer are similar to FLSA definitions.101 As it is a
state law, the NYS LL extends coverage to all workers throughout
the state. Like FLSA,102 the NYS LL allows for attorney’s fees for
the prevailing party.103 Similar to the U.S. DOL policy,104 the New
York State Attorney General issued an opinion in 2003 expressing
that undocumented workers may assert their rights under the NYS
LL without fear of immigration consequences.105 While undocu-
mented workers are covered by the NYS LL, many workers do not
realize this, and many employers take advantage of this situation.106
94 N.Y. LAB. LAW §1 et seq. (McKinney 2011).
95 See infra notes 108–20, 213–27 and accompanying text for further discussion
about the NY DOL.
96 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198(3), 663(3) (McKinney 2011).
97 Id. § 652(1) (New York State minimum wage is currently $7.25/hour, the same
as federal law).
98 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)–(2) (2011).
99 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.12, § 142–2.2 (2011).
100 Id. §§ 137-1.7, 142–2.4; WORKING WITHOUT LAWS, supra note 6, at 20.
101 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§  651(5)–(6) (McKinney 2011). Compare with 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e)(1) –(5) (2011).
102 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2011).
103 N. Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198(1-a), 663(1) (McKinney 2011).
104 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
105 Formal Opinion No. 2003-F3, N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. No. F3, 2003 WL 22522840
(N.Y.A.G. Oct. 21, 2003).
106 Interview with Amy Carroll, former Legal Director, Make the Road New York, in
N.Y.C. (Aug. 11, 2011). Notes on file with the author.
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NYS LL is especially important to low-wage workers, as many
businesses produce less than $500,000 in annual gross revenues
and do not produce goods for interstate commerce and are not
covered by FLSA. Thus, for many New Yorkers who work in small
businesses—such as restaurants, landscaping, and construction
companies—NYS LL is the only remedy available.107
2. New York State Labor Law Reform
a. History of Workers’ Rights Organizations’ Advocacy Efforts to
Reform the New York State Labor Law
Workers’ rights advocates in New York State have long called
for better protections against wage theft and for the NY DOL to
improve enforcement regarding wage and hour violations.108 Cit-
ing a lack of enforcement by the NY DOL and insufficient penalties
that did not deter employers from violating the law, immigrant
workers from The Workplace Project in Long Island, NY, lobbied
for The Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act (“UWPA”), which passed in
1997.109 The UWPA’s main provisions altered the NYS LL to create
a felony offense for wage theft and increased fines for repeat of-
fenders (from $200–$10,000 to $500–$20,000).110 The law also in-
creased civil penalties for repeat or willful offenders of
nonpayment of wages, so that employers must pay an increased
fine to the NY DOL up to an additional 100% (or double) the
amount of wages owed to the worker.111 In addition, because of the
1997 law, NY DOL investigations are now required to review viola-
tions for six years prior to the commencement of an action, as op-
posed to two years as was former NY DOL practice.112
The Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, while a step in the right
direction, did not effectively address wage theft in New York State.
107 See JENNIFER GORDON, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE UNPAID WAGES PROHIBITION ACT: LATINO IMMIGRANTS CHANGE NEW YORK
WAGE LAW 39 n.8 (Sept. 1999), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
imp_wp4gordon.pdf.
108 See CAMPAIGN TO END WAGE THEFT, PROTECTING NEW YORK’S WORKERS: HOW THE
STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CAN IMPROVE WAGE-AND-HOUR ENFORCEMENT 16 (Dec.
2006), available at http://www.mfy.org/wp-content/uploads/reports/Protecting-
Workers-Dept-of-Labor.pdf (many of these provisions were included in the WTPA)
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN TO END WAGE THEFT].
109 GORDON, supra note 107, at 3–9 (the Act altered the following provisions of the
NYS LL: Creation of 196-A, 198.3, 198-a, creation of 199-A, 218.1); see also N.Y. LAB.
LAW §§ 196(A), 198.3, 198-a, 199-A, 218.1 (McKinney 2011).
110 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 2011).
111 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 218.1 (McKinney 1997), amended by N.Y. LAB. LAW § 218.1 (Mc-
Kinney 2010).
112 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198.3 (McKinney 2011); see also GORDON, supra note 107, at 7
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Organizers of the legislation focused on targeting repeat offenders,
but many employers who were committing wage theft were never
caught to begin with.113 Organizers also claimed that the NY DOL
did not use the new tools that the law had given the agency.114
After the law was passed, the Workplace Project reported an in-
crease in workers who came to their offices and became involved
with the organization.115 The bill did not require additional spend-
ing and did not directly attack the agency’s practices.116 These two
aspects were perhaps reasons why the bill was able to pass, but or-
ganizers caution that it may have also “undermined its
effectiveness.”117
Because the Workplace Project did not continue to focus its or-
ganizing and advocacy work for the implementation of the law
as it had for its passage, the Department of Labor was let off the
hook. Without ongoing activism and bad publicity, the DOL had
little incentive to do things differently after the bill became
law.118
A main goal of the legislation itself was to deter employers
from stealing wages, so that even if the agency was not able to do its
job, the law would be “self-enforcing.”119 Deterrence is very difficult
to measure. Workers’ rights advocates continued to fight wage
theft after the implementation of the law, suggesting that the law
did not adequately address wage theft in New York. For example,
in 2006, nine years after the law was passed, workers’ rights advo-
cates declared it to be “open season on low wage workers, because
employers know they can violate the law with impunity.”120
In 2009, after requests from MRNY Workplace Justice Project
committee members and many consultations with MRNY or-
ganizers, the organization’s legal team began drafting legislation to
113 See GORDON, supra note 107, at 30–32.
114 Id. at 31. For example, wage theft activists report that it is not agency practice
for the NY DOL to investigate violations for six years prior to the commencement of
an action, as they are required to do by the NY LL. Interview with Amy Carroll, supra
note 106.
115 GORDON, supra note 107, at 32.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See id., at 32 (quoting Jennifer Gordon, former director of The Workplace
Project).
119 Id.
120 Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Report Urges Better Enforcement of
Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.brennan
center.org/content/resource/report_urges_better_enforcement_of_minimum_wage
_and_overtime_laws/ (quoting Amy Carroll, former Legal Director of Make the Road
New York).
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reform the NYS LL. During the past fourteen years MRNY has won
millions of dollars in unpaid wages and damages for their primarily
low-wage, Latino/a immigrant members.121 Despite their victories
for individual workers, immigrant workers continued to suffer
wage theft.122 As MRNY directors wrote in a recent article, wage
theft became a policy priority because of their members’ exper-
iences “combating wage theft, facing retaliation, and attempting to
collect on judgments when they won.”123 According to MRNY, the
existing law’s provisions did not create incentives for employers to
comply with the law; penalties for wage theft were very low, as was
the chance of getting caught.124 The bill also needed to address the
difficulty in receiving unpaid wages and damages. As Amy Carroll,
the former Legal Director at MRNY and lead drafter of the WTPA,
aptly said, “winning cases is easy but finding the money is hard.”125
From the very beginning of the campaign, organizers pitched the
law as targeting lawbreakers; the messaging conveyed that law-abid-
ing employers do not have anything to fear, because this law would
impact only those who were stealing wages.126 MRNY conducted
extensive research on other states’ labor laws and FLSA.127 MRNY
Workplace Justice Project Committee members were surprised to
find out that even Arizona, a state that has come under scrutiny for
its harsh anti-immigrant laws, offered better worker protections
than NYS LL.128
In 2010 Senator Diane Savino and Assemblyman Carl Heastie
introduced the WTPA in the New York State Senate and Assembly,
respectively.129 Advocates hailed the Act as a “key component of
121 Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 154.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1.
125 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 23 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-362, 364 (2007) (Arizona’s revised labor law, the
“Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Arizonans Act,” which includes similar en-
forcement provisions to the WTPA). Arizona has come under fire for the anti-immi-
grant bill SB1070. See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24im-
mig.html.
129 See Senator Savino Introduces Bill to Protect Workers from Wage Theft, N.Y.  STATE SEN-
ATOR DIANE J. SAVINO, http://www.nysenate.gov/video/2010/mar/12/senator-savino-
introduces-bill-protect-workers-wage-theft (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The Wage Theft
Prevention Act was supported by various organizations in addition to MRNY, includ-
ing United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1500, Small Business United For
Health Care, The Working Families Party, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store
Union, 32BJ SEIU, New York Hotel & Motel Trades Council, 1199 SEIU, Drum Major
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the fight to end wage theft in New York.”130 After a series of amend-
ments to the bills, negotiated over a nine-month period, the WTPA
passed in both houses of the New York State Legislature and was
signed by Governor Patterson on December 13, 2010.131 The law
was enacted on April 9, 2011.132 Subsequent sections of this paper
will discuss key provisions of the WTPA and its effect on NYS LL,
and how it better addresses the insidious problem of wage theft in
New York State than the former NYS LL. Key provisions include:
increasing economic incentives for employers to comply with the
law, thus deterring employers from violating the NYS LL; protect-
ing workers against unlawful retaliation by increasing penalties for
employers; ensuring that workers are able to collect unpaid wages
after judgments in their favor; improving record-keeping provi-
sions; and expanding the required notice given to employees about
wage rates. These provisions will be discussed in detail in subse-
quent sections of this paper.
b. New Law for Workers’ Rights: A Discussion of Substantive
Sections and Goals of the WTPA
The following sections describe the main goals of the WTPA.
Topics include substantive changes to the NYS LL and MRNY’s rea-
sons for targeting specific provisions.
i. Economic Incentives for Employers to Comply with the
Law
Workers’ rights advocates in New York have long complained
that former NYS LL provisions did not effectively deter employers
from breaking the law and committing wage theft.133 Increasing
economic incentives for employers to comply with the law is a key
theme of the WTPA, in hopes of deterring wage theft. Prior to the
WTPA, NYS LL allowed for liquidated damages of an additional
Institute for Public Policy, New York State AFL-CIO, Morton Williams Supermarkets,
The National Employment Law Project, New York State Trial Lawyers Association,
New York Communities for Change, Workers Rights Law Center, and MFY Legal Ser-
vices, Inc.
130 Annette Bernhardt, Testimony Before the New York City Council, Committee on Civil
Service and Labor Regarding Proposed Resolution 245-A (Nov. 10, 2010), available at www.
nelp.org/page/-/Justice/. . ./NYCwagethefttestimonyNov2010.
131 Governor Patterson Signs Into Law the Wage Theft Prevention Act, LABOR AND EMP’T
N.Y. (Dec. 20, 2010, 12:50 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/LELblog/2010/12/gover
nor_paterson_signs_into_l_3.html.
132 Id.
133 See Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 154.
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25% of the unpaid wages,134 an amount thought to be token and
no real deterrence.135 The WTPA increased the maximum amount
of liquidated damages up to 100%,136 meaning that employers may
now have to pay up to double the amount of wages owed to work-
ers. Like the WTPA, twenty-one states plus the District of Columbia
provide for double damages,137 while seven states provide for treble
damages (back pay plus 200% liquidated damages) for minimum
wage violations and/or payment of wages violations.138 This in-
crease may help deter employers from violating the NYS LL, since
they will suffer greater economic consequences and have to pay
double the amount they would have had to pay workers in the first
place. This increase in liquidated damages provides that a worker
may receive an equal amount of liquidated damages under NYS LL
or FLSA (workers are able to recover 100% liquidated damages
under FLSA).139
ii. Protecting Workers Against Retaliation by Punishing
Employers who Retaliate
Illegal retaliation was one of the main concerns of MRNY
members and staff, because they saw the threat as preventing em-
ployees from pursuing claims for unpaid wages or workplace viola-
tions.140 Many MRNY members feared employers would call
134 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney 2009), amended by L. 2010, c. 564 § 7.
135 See Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 154–55.
136 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198 (McKinney 2011).
137 Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(a) (1995); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-
218(a)(2) (2006); California: CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1194.2(a) (West 2011), 2673.1(e)
(West 1999); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-109(3)(a)-(b) (2007); Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-68(a) (1963), 31-72 (1967); Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289
Conn. 769 (2008); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE § 32-1012(a) (1993); Florida: FLA.
STAT. § 10.24(e) (2004); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 34-4-6 (1970); Hawaii: HAW. REV.
STAT. § 387-12(b) (1999); Indiana: IND. CODE § 22-2-2-9 (1986); Kansas: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-315(b) (1999); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.385(1) (West 2010);
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 177.27(8) (2009); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.527
(2006); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-206(1) (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-
407 (1979); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22(a1) (1991); North Dakota:
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-14-09.1(2) (1989); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 197.9
(1965); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 652.230(1) (1995); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 60-11-7 (2008), Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 342a(b) (2006); 395
(2001); and Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. §§109.03(5) (2011); § 109.11(2)(b) (1993).
138 Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-355(a), 23-364(g) (2012); Idaho: IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 44-1508(2),45-615 (West 2012); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 626-A,
670 (2012); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151, §§ 1B, 20 (2012); Michigan:
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 408.393, 408.488 (2012); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-
26(c) (2012); and Ohio: OHIO CONST. art. II § 34a.
139 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2011).
140 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
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immigration officials if they spoke out about abuses at the work-
place.141 The WTPA changes key provisions in the NYS LL to more
effectively deter employers from unlawfully retaliating against a
worker who speaks up about violations such as unpaid wages or
workplace safety issues. Nine other states and the District of Colum-
bia also include anti-retaliation provisions in their labor laws.142
While the NYS LL has always outlawed illegal retaliation,143 the
WTPA expands the protection given to workers and grants the NY
DOL more enforcement powers. For example, the WTPA expands
the types of criminally prohibited retaliation to include retaliatory
actions taken against workers complaining about nonpayment and
exercising any other wage and hour rights, closing loopholes al-
lowed under prior law.144 Threats are now included as a form of
retaliatory conduct. Protection against retaliation applies as long as
the employee has a good faith belief that the employer has violated
the labor law.145 Under the WTPA, “any person” is prohibited from
retaliating against an employee, not just the employer.146 Regard-
ing costs to employers who retaliate, the NY DOL had the power to
fine an employer up to $10,000.147 With the passage of the WTPA,
the DOL can now order the person who retaliated against the em-
ployee to pay the employee up to $10,000 in liquidated damages as
well.148
The WTPA contains similar provisions regarding retaliation as
those contained in FLSA. Under FLSA, “any person”149 who will-
fully retaliates against an employee may be “subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both.”150 FLSA also provides for such “legal or equita-
ble relief as may be appropriate,” including reinstatement of the
employee.151 FLSA also provides for liquidated damages equal to
141 Id.
142 Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-364(b), (g) (2012); California: CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 98.6, 1171.5 (West 2012); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-69b (2012);
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE § 32-1010 (2012); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1509
(2012); Illinois: 802 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/11(c) (2012); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 151 § 19(1) (2012); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.483 (2012); New
Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-26.1 (2012); and Ohio: OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34a.us
143 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215 (McKinney 2009), amended by 2010 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1452.
144 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney 2011).
145 Id. § 215(1)(a).
146 Id.
147 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215 (McKinney 2009), amended by 2010 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1452.
148 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215(1)(b) (McKinney 2011).
149 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2011).
150 Id. § 216(a) (2011).
151 Id. § 216(b) (2011).
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the amount of lost wages, but does not provide for up to $10,000 in
liquidated damages, as does NYS LL, altered by the WTPA.152
iii. Ensuring that Workers are Able to Collect Unpaid
Wages by Granting Courts and the NY DOL the
Necessary Mechanisms to Enforce Judgments
WTPA provisions address the fact that many MRNY members
never receive payment after they receive judgments in their favor.
Under prior NYS LL, the NY DOL did not have the power to obtain
asset information in order to assist with collecting unpaid wages,153
nor does FLSA provide this power to the U.S. DOL.154 The WTPA
grants courts and the NY DOL the power to freeze assets and order
increased penalties after employers default on judgments. If the
Labor Commissioner of the NY DOL issues an Order to Comply
against an employer and they have yet to pay the employee the
wages due, the NY DOL may now order the employer to provide a
list of their assets ten days after the appeal period ends.155 In addi-
tion, if the employer does not provide the NY DOL with a list of
assets (such as bank accounts and real property), courts have the
authority to award up to $10,000 civil penalty for lack of compli-
ance.156 This is extremely important because often low-wage work-
ers receive a judgment in their favor but never see the money,
because, for example, the employer has transferred his or her as-
sets to someone else, sold the business and moved on, or has disap-
peared and is nowhere to be found. Finally, the WTPA also
provides that where an employer defaults on a final judgment or
Order to Comply for more than ninety days, the employer must
pay an additional 15% in damages.157 These increased penalties
are meant to deter employers from violating the NYS LL, and por-
tray the message that it is cheaper for employers to comply with
rather than violate the law.
iv. Improved Record-Keeping Provisions under the WTPA
The WTPA strengthens existing record-keeping requirements
for employers, allowing workers to have more complete informa-
tion about their wage rates and hours worked. MRNY included
these provisions to increase transparency and provide workers with
152 Id.; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215(1)(b) (McKinney 2011).
153 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 196 (McKinney 2009), amended by 2010 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1452.
154 This provision is not listed in FLSA.
155 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 196(1)(d) (McKinney 2011).
156 Id.
157 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198(4), 218(1), 219(1), 663(4) (McKinney 2011).
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important information about their wages due.158 In addition to for-
mer NYS LL provisions requiring accurate payroll records, the law
now states that employers must keep records on an ongoing ba-
sis.159 For example, employers may not create records after the pe-
riod of time the employee worked. This helps to prevent
fraudulent record-keeping on part of employers, which can be
used in an attempt to refute NY DOL investigations regarding un-
paid wages or overtime. Additionally, payroll records must now in-
clude information regarding how the employee is paid.160 If the
employee is paid by piece rate, the record must detail what rates
apply and the number of pieces paid at each rate.161 While former
law required that employers give employees wage statements or pay
stubs,162 the WTPA provides that pay stubs contain additional infor-
mation, such as the employer’s name, address and phone number,
dates covered by the payment, and hours worked, including over-
time hours.163 FLSA contains similar provisions to the WTPA;
under FLSA, an employer is required to “make, keep and preserve”
employment records and state how an employee is paid (for exam-
ple, by shift), but FLSA does not specify that employers must keep
the records on an ongoing basis.164 Under FLSA, employers are
required to keep records for three years,165 compared to six years
under the WTPA.166
v. Improved Notice Given to Employees about Wage Rates
The WTPA improves former labor law provisions regarding
the wage rate notice that is given to employees prior to employ-
ment—increasing the information to be provided, and requiring
annual updates—and requires notice of labor law violations to be
posted in the workplace. The WTPA also allows for workers to re-
ceive up to $2,500 in damages if they do not receive a wage rate
notice within their first ten business days on the job, which helps
deter employers from non-compliance with the law.167
158 Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 155.
159 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(4) (McKinney 2011).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney 2009), amended by 2010 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1452.
163 N.Y. LAB. LAW §195(3) (McKinney 2011).
164 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2011).
165 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #21: RECORDKEEP-
ING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2008), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs21.htm.
166 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(4) (McKinney 2011).
167 Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 155; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-b) (McKinney 2011).
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Like the improved record-keeping provisions, MRNY targeted
wage-rate notice provisions to increase transparency and informa-
tion available to the worker.168 Translation of documents was also a
concern of MRNY, because English is a second language for many
MRNY members.169 While the former law required employers to
give written notice to each employee about wage rates when they
are hired,170 the WTPA requires employers to provide each new
hire and all employees written notice of their wage rates by Febru-
ary 1st of each year.171
The WTPA also expands what must be included in the written
notice of wage rates. The notice must now include how the em-
ployee is paid—by the hour, shift, or day, for example—which will
help advocates and the NY DOL better calculate worker’s correct
wages.172 The official employer name and any names that the em-
ployer uses for business, as well as addresses and phone numbers,
must now be included on the notice of wage rate.173 This helps
advocates, the NY DOL, and the workers themselves correctly iden-
tify their employer (since employers often hide behind various.
“doing business as” names) and contact or locate employers.174
Wage rate notices must also include any allowances taken out of
employees’ paychecks.175 While former NYS LL did not require
that the notice be in any language other than English,176 the notice
must now be in English and in the employee’s native language;
employers may use language templates prepared by the NY
DOL.177
The WTPA also provides that the NY DOL Commissioner may
publicly post violations of the labor law for up to a year in a place
visible to employees.178 For willful violations, the NY DOL Commis-
sioner may post a summary of violations for up to ninety days in a
location visible to the public, with misdemeanor charges possible
for those who tamper or remove the notice without permission.179
168 Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 155; Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
169 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
170 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney 2009), amended by L.2010, c. 564 § 3.
171 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKinney 2011).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
175 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKinney 2011).
176 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney 2009), amended by N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKin-
ney 2010).
177 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKinney 2011).
178 Id. § 219-c.
179 Id.
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Therefore, employees can now be fully aware of workplace viola-
tions committed by their employer, and know to be on the lookout
for similar violations. FLSA does not contain a similar provision.180
MRNY chose to supplement the wage-rate notice provision because
of the need for increased language access for immigrant workers.
As a result, the improved wage notice requirements allow workers
to be aware of correct contact information for their employers as
well as important information regarding how they are paid, infor-
mation that helps facilitate wage and hour claims.
vi. Providing Enforcement Tools to the NY DOL and
Improving Agency Process
The WTPA also codifies best practices of the NY DOL and
gives the agency tools to more effectively carry out their responsi-
bilities. Based on MRNY Legal Department’s experience working
with the NY DOL, the organization wanted to provide tools to en-
able the agency to more efficiently resolve wage and hour violation
claims. The WTPA closed various loopholes, clarified inconsisten-
cies in the NYS LL, and codified good practices of the NY DOL, so
that pro-worker policies would not be changed by subsequent ad-
ministrations.181 For example, the WTPA codifies the NY DOL’s
practice of keeping employees’ identities confidential during an in-
vestigation, until necessary to disclose in order to resolve a case.182
The WTPA also codifies the agency’s practice of investigating third
party complaints.183 Prior law contained a loophole that only gave
the NY DOL authority to investigate complaints or bring criminal
proceedings under Article 6 (nonpayment of wages) of the NYS
LL, and not under Article 5 (meal breaks), Article 19 (minimum
wage), or Article 19-a (farm workers).184 The WTPA also tolls the
statute of limitations during an NY DOL investigation.185 This pre-
vents workers from having cases eventually brought in court dis-
missed because of delays in agency investigations.186 The new law
also gives the NY DOL discretion to assess up to 100% liquidated
180 But see 29 U.S.C. § 218b (2011) (employers must post notice of enrollment in a
health plan).
181 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
182 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 196-a(a) (McKinney 2011).
183 Id. § 196(1)(b); Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
184 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 196 (McKinney 2010), amended by [L 2010, c.564 § 4]; N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 218 (McKinney 2010), amended by [L.2010, c. 564, § 11]; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 219
(McKinney 2010), amended by [L.2010, c. 564, § 12; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 219-c (McKinney
2011).
185 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(3) (McKinney 2011).
186 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
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damages during negotiations,187 increasing the agency’s bargain-
ing capabilities to reach settlements quickly.188
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE WTPA
Objections to the WTPA include a recent NYS Senate bill that
would repeal the WTPA. Bill S.4452, titled “An Act to Repeal the
Wage Theft Prevention Act,” was introduced on April 6, 2011, by
Senator John DeFrancisco, a Republican representing Syracuse
and neighboring areas.189 The justification for the bill claims that
New York State has some of the most “anti-business laws in the
country, which are making it increasingly difficult for businesses to
justify remaining in the state.”190 It proceeds to state that the
WTPA increases the burden on businesses and potential liability on
employers, “when many are already struggling to survive.”191 Sena-
tor DeFrancisco, perhaps sensing that repealing the entire WTPA
would not be possible, also introduced Bill S.6063A, calling for the
elimination of the annual notice requirement mandated by the
WTPA.192 The bill passed the Senate on February 29, 2012, and is
currently in the New York State Assembly for consideration.193
Additionally, business groups such as the National Federation
of Independent Business and the Business Council of New York
State have lobbied against the WTPA.194 New York State Assembly
Minority Leader Brian M. Kolb claims that the WTPA will steal jobs
from New York State and create endless paperwork requirements
for employers.195 Assemblyman Kolb also claims that “a few bad ap-
187 The law mandates up to 100% liquidated damages in an “order to comply,”
which is issued if settlement is not reached. See N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198, 663 (McKinney
2011).
188 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106.
189 S.4452, 2001 S. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/
bill/S4452-2011.  As of this writing, the bill was referred to the Labor Committee on
January 4, 2012. Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 S.6063A (N.Y. 2012), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=
&bn=S06063&term=&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Votes=Y&Text=Y
193 Id.
194 See Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 157; see also Press Release, Assembly Minority
Leader Brian M. Kolb, Stop Thief! So-Called “Wage Theft Prevention Act will Steal Away
More Jobs and Hurt Businesses,” (Apr. 8, 2011) available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/
Minority/20110408/.
195 Kolb, supra note 194; see also Brian M. Kolb, Leader Kolb Again Recognized As A
Champion of Small Business—But There Is Still More Work To Do!, ASSEMBLYMAN BRIAN M.
KOLB (Aug. 24, 2012), http://assembly.state.ny.us/mem/Brian-M-Kolb/story/49584/
.
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ples” commit wage theft, therefore the WTPA is unnecessary.196
Each argument will be addressed in the following paragraphs.
WTPA opponents argue that the law’s provisions are more
costly and time-consuming for employers. The WTPA alters ex-
isting record-keeping requirements in the NYS LL by requiring ad-
ditional information on pay stubs, such as employer names and
addresses.197 The law also requires that employers provide their
employees with annual notice of their wage rates, instead of only at
the time of hire,198 the provision attacked by the recent passage of
NYS Senate Bill 6063A.199 Indeed, the sample form provided by NY
DOL is a single page,200 but Sen. DeFrancisco calls the require-
ment a “massive, costly mandate on every employer in the state.”201
The WTPA requires that these notices be translated into the em-
ployee’s native language, and the employer may use document
templates translated into different languages provided by the NY
DOL.202 If the NY DOL does not provide a template for the lan-
guage identified by the employee as his or her primary language,
the employer may satisfy his obligation under the law by providing
the notice to the employee in English alone.203 An employer does
not have to pay to translate the wage rate notices.204
Employers were also required to furnish pay stubs prior to the
law.205 The WTPA provisions create minimal increased paperwork
requirements for employers and are not unduly burdensome. It
does not mandate any increased business costs, such as an increase
in wages. The WTPA will in fact help law-abiding businesses save
money. Honest employers will no longer face unfair competition
by competitors who save on labor costs by withholding wages
due.206
196 Id.
197 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(3) (McKinney 2011); see also supra text accompanying notes
158–66.
198 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKinney 2011).
199 See S.6063A, supra note 192.
200 The sample form provided by the NY DOL is available at http://www.labor.ny.
gov/formsdocs/wp/WTPA%20Sample%20Wage-Statement.jpg.
201 Dave Jamieson, Wage Theft Law Targeted for Repeal by New York GOP, THE HUF-
FINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/
13/wage-theft-law-new-york_n_1342919.html.
202 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(b) (McKinney 2011). Templates are provided by NY
DOL at http://www.labor.ny.gov/formsdocs/wp/ellsformsandpublications.shtm.
203 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(c) (McKinney 2011).
204 See id. (noting that if an employee speaks a language for which a template is not
available from the NY DOL, the employer may comply with this requirement by pro-
viding an English-language notice or acknowledgment).
205 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney 2009), amended by [L.2010, c. 564, § 3].
206 See Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 157.
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Another argument against the WTPA is that only certain em-
ployers, “a few bad apples,” steal wages from employees, but all em-
ployers must comply with the new law. While it is difficult to know
exactly how many employers commit wage theft, statistics reveal
that it is a widespread problem. As stated previously, it is estimated
that wage theft steals $1 billion from New York City workers. In
2010 the NY DOL collected $26.6 million in illegally underpaid
wages.207 The statistics show that the problem of wage theft is en-
demic and widespread. It is highly unlikely that a problem of this
magnitude is created by a few bad apples; but rather it is likely the
product of systemic acceptance of lax enforcement and inadequate
labor laws.
Finally, WTPA opponents argue that the law will cause busi-
nesses to leave New York State en masse, because of increased re-
quirements and costs to businesses. The WTPA is part of a
nationwide movement of state labor law reform to fight wage
theft.208 Many states have passed wage theft laws in the last five
years.209 As most wage theft laws are recent, it is difficult to gather
statistics regarding the number of businesses who have left states
that have increased protections against wage theft. Analyzing busi-
ness statistics may provide insight regarding the effect of pro-
worker laws on business presence in New York State. U.S. Census
Bureau data shows a steady increase in the number of businesses in
New York State before the implementation of the Unpaid Wages
Prohibition Act in 1997 through 2008, with a slight decline in
2009.210 It could therefore be inferred that businesses did not leave
207 Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, Labor Department Returns $26.6 Mil-
lion in Back Wages to Workers in 2010: Second Highest Total in Labor Department
History (Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2011/janu
ary-03-2011.shtm.
208 See the Wage Theft Campaign Map, http://wagetheft.org/campaignmap/camp
aignmap.html for a list of current wage theft campaigns across the country, including
state and local campaigns. WAGE THEFT, http://wagetheft.org/campaignmap/cam
paignmap.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012); see also TIM JUDSON & CRISTINA FRANCISCO
MCGUIRE, WHERE THEFT IS LEGAL: MAPPING WAGE THEFT LAWS IN THE 50 STATES (June
2012), available at  http://www.progressivestates.org/wagetheft. The Progressive
States Network report states that New York and Massachusetts, the highest ranked
states, have barely passing grades and have just recently begun addressing wage theft,
while the vast majority of states have few protections, if any. Id.
209 Id.
210 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES: NEW YORK-ALL INDUS-
TRIES-BY YEAR, http://www.census.gov/epcd/susb/latest/ny/NY—.HTM. In 1996,
New York State had 411,120 total firms, in 2002 the state had 428,425 firms, and in
2008 the state had 443,992 firms. Id. In 2009, New York State had 441,241 total firms,
a slight decline from 2008. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES: HIS-
TORICAL DATA TABULATIONS BY ENTERPRISE SIZE-2009, U.S. & STATES, TOTALS, http://
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New York State because of the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, an
act with similar goals as the WTPA.211 While it is too soon to tell if
businesses will leave New York State because of the WTPA, the law
does not create undue burdens on employers and only targets em-
ployers who violate the law.
The WTPA will even the playing field by reigning in unlawful
employers who economically benefit by not complying with the
law. The WTPA will help all employers compete fairly, thus foster-
ing a business environment that will encourage business growth in
New York. As WTPA advocates have pointed out since the begin-
ning of the campaign, law-abiding employers have nothing to
fear.212
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTPA AND HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN NEW YORK STATE
While it is too early to chart the WTPA’s progress, workers’
rights advocates are hopeful, and they are already seeing results.
“At long last, this puts real teeth in New York’s Labor Law,” said
Andrew Friedman, former Director of MRNY, after the WTPA was
signed into law.213 In March of 2010, an upscale restaurant in New
York City agreed to hand over $200,000 to settle a NY DOL investi-
gation into the restaurant’s practice of wage and hour violations
and retaliatory firing of organized workers.214 The NYS Attorney
General’s office stated that $20,000 of the settlement, liquidated
damages for workers, was made possible by the WTPA, and that
this case is an example of how the law provides new remedies that
effectively protect workers.215 In order to ensure that the WTPA is a
successful tool against wage theft, effective enforcement and inves-
tigation by the NY DOL is needed, as well as strong education and
outreach efforts.
www.census.gov/econ/susb/data/susb2009.html. A firm is defined as a “business or-
ganization consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the same state and
industry that were specified under common ownership or control.” DEFINITIONS, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES, available at http://www.census.gov/
econ/susb/definitions.html.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 108–20.
212 See Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 157–58.
213 Dolnick, supra note 5.
214 Daniel Massey, Manhattan Eatery Forks Over Cash for Wage Theft, CRAIN’S NEW YORK
BUS. (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:48 pm), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120301/LA-
BOR_UNIONS/120309990.
215 Id.
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A. Enforcement of the New Law
Many workers’ rights advocates have critiqued the NY DOL’s
actions regarding enforcement and investigation of wage and hour
complaints. A December 2006 report by the Campaign to End
Wage Theft, a coalition of over twenty-four community organiza-
tions in New York State (including MRNY), detailed suggestions
regarding how the NY DOL could improve their enforcement of
wage and hour laws.216 The report listed six recommendations:
(1) Aggressively investigate complaints and pursue all remedies
provided by law, (2) Systematically and proactively investigate
high-violation industries, (3) Partner with community and labor
groups for expertise and worker outreach, (4) Improve respon-
siveness to the needs of immigrant workers, (5) Improve coordi-
nation with state and local enforcement agencies to protect
workers, and (6) Make the NY DOL more accessible, accounta-
ble, and transparent.217
As MRNY felt strongly about the need to give the NY DOL more
tools to be able to do their job effectively, the WTPA addresses
many of the community organizations’ concerns listed in the 2006
report.218 For example, the report asked that the NY DOL fully pro-
tect workers from retaliation by adopting a formal policy to keep
all names of employees who file a complaint confidential.219 The
WTPA codifies this practice of maintaining confidentiality.220 The
report also recommended strengthening the consequences for em-
ployer misconduct in order to deter employers from relying on vio-
lating worker rights as a business practice and protecting workers
from unlawful retaliation.221 The WTPA addresses both of these
issues.222
Advocates are hopeful that WTPA provisions granting the NY
DOL more power to do their work, combined with recent funding
for the agency, will improve enforcement. The NY DOL Labor
Standards Division223 budget has increased over the past few years.
For the fiscal year of 2010–11, the Department’s budget was
216 CAMPAIGN TO END WAGE THEFT, supra note 108.
217 Id. at 3.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 181–88.
219 CAMPAIGN TO END WAGE THEFT, supra note 108, at 6.
220 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 196-a (McKinney 2011).
221 CAMPAIGN TO END WAGE THEFT, supra note 108, at 16.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 133–152.
223 See DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS, http://www.labor.ny.gov/workerprotec
tion/laborstandards/labor_standards.shtm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011) (Department
of Labor Standards is charged with enforcement of wage and hour laws); see also
MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 25, at 71.
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$17,474,000, an increase from $14,411,000 in the 2006–07 fiscal
year.224 The NY DOL estimates that over the past five years there
has been a 5% increase in the number of full-time employees work-
ing on wage and hour enforcement.225 However, the NY DOL re-
ports an average delay of one-and-a-half years before an
investigation begins, due to the large volume of cases.226 The
agency reports that large quantities of wages, fines, and penalties
go uncollected: in 2009, $45,608,966 went uncollected, a dramatic
increase from $13,637,494 in 2005.227
B. Education and Outreach Necessary for Effective Implementation of
the WTPA
Changing the law alone will not solve wage theft; the NY DOL
and community organizations must have effective outreach pro-
grams in the community. If the NYS LL is truly going to deter em-
ployers from breaking the law, then they must know about it. The
NY DOL has created resources, such as a WTPA fact sheet, and
addressed Frequently Asked Questions, available on its website
under “Wage and Hour,” so that employers may learn more about
the WTPA.228 The fact sheet details the main provisions under the
WTPA, and is geared towards employers.229 The Frequently Asked
Questions document about the Wage Theft Prevention Act appears
to be comprehensive, and states that NY DOL officers will address
inquiries submitted by e-mail in a “timely manner.”230 While the NY
DOL website materials are a good starting point for outreach and
implementation, this must not be the only employer-outreach the
Department does.
In order for there to be effective implementation of the
WTPA, organizations like MRNY must conduct outreach about the
new provisions as well.231 In the case of MRNY, the organization’s
Brooklyn and Queens offices have Workplace Justice Project com-
mittees, and two workers rights organizers; the groups meet weekly,
224 MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 25, at 71.
225 Id. at 77.
226 Id. at 130.
227 Id. at 144.
228 Wage Theft Prevention Act: FAQ, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.ny.
gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/PDFs/wage-theft-prevention-act-faq.pdf (last
visited May 12, 2011).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Kirk Semple, A Boon for Nannies, if Only They Knew, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/nyregion/few-domestic-workers-know-about-
law-protecting-them.html.
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with organizers and worker/members taking on leadership roles
within each group.232 Members participate in planning campaigns,
direct action such as protests or boycotts, and skills trainings.233
Members of the Workplace Justice Project committees who were
active in the WTPA campaign helped develop a PowerPoint train-
ing, and have given the training to all MRNY member commit-
tees.234 The passage of the WTPA has not only given MRNY the
opportunity to conduct more “know your rights” trainings about
workers’ rights under the NYS LL, but also the opportunity to talk
about the increased protections for workers under the WTPA.235
MRNY Legal Department staff and Workplace Justice Project mem-
bers continue to conduct workers’ rights trainings for social service
agencies and community groups in New York City and Long Island,
training other advocates about the new law.236 They also conduct
trainings for frontline social service workers and staff who work
with immigrants and may not know how to issue spot for wage and
hour violations.237
Workers’ rights organizations must also continue to educate
workers that, regardless of their immigration status, they can seek
redress under the NY DOL238 (in addition to FLSA, if workers qual-
ify).239 “There is a huge misperception in general about whether
the [labor] law protects workers, regardless of their immigration
status,” said Amy Carroll, former Legal Director for MRNY. “Em-
ployers add to this misconception by threatening workers, saying
that they will call immigration if workers report unpaid wages or
unsafe working conditions.”240 MRNY’s current outreach is another
way to educate the immigrant community in New York City about
this misperception. The NY DOL also has a six-person Bureau of
232 See MAKE THE ROAD NEW YORK, http://maketheroad.org/whatwedo_workplace.
php and http://maketheroad.org/howwework_community.php (last visited May 12,
2011) (providing more information on MRNY’s Workplace Justice Project); see also
Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 154.
233 Advocacy Story, supra note 3, at 154.




238 See 2003 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. F3, supra note 105.
239 See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Centeno-Bernuy v.
Perry, 2009 Dist. LEXIS 103580, 19-20 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2009) (applying FLSA pro-
tections to citizens and non-citizens alike).
240 Interview with Amy Carroll, supra note 106; see also Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d
1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that undocumented workers are especially vulner-
able to workplace abuse, discrimination, and exploitation as well as the fear of being
turned over to immigration officials).
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Immigrant Workers’ Rights that conducts outreach in immigrant
communities.241
A mix of legislative reforms and community activism is needed
in order to target wage theft. The WTPA is a positive step in the
fight against wage theft in New York State. We cannot change the
law and expect for wage theft to magically disappear; outreach to
employers and workers is needed, including immigrant workers
who are not aware that their minimum wage rate is in violation of
the law, in addition to better enforcement and investigation by the
NY DOL.242
CONCLUSION
Wage theft is a widespread problem in New York, especially
amongst low-wage workers. Specifically, wage theft disproportion-
ately affects immigrant and women low-wage workers in our com-
munities.243 Prior NYS LL did not effectively deter employers from
violating the law. “The fines were so minimal that many rogue em-
ployers saw them as the cost of doing business,” said Senator Diane
Savino, lead sponsor of the WTPA.244 Advocates hope that the
WTPA will be an effective tool against wage theft in New York State,
because the law offers greater protections for workers against wage
theft, and we have already seen positive results for workers. Out-
reach and education by the NY DOL and workers’ rights organiza-
tions is necessary for further effective implementation of the
WTPA. The WTPA is an impressive victory for victims of wage theft
in the state, and attempts to repeal the bill must be resisted.
241 MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 25, at 163.
242 See GORDON, supra note 107, at 30.
243 See supra notes 15–25 and accompanying text.
244 Dolnick, supra note 5 (quoting New York State Senator Diane J. Savino, a Demo-
crat who was the lead sponsor of the WTPA Senate bill).
